

Hoefel	Menendez	Schakowsky
Hooley	Millender-	Scott
Houghton	McDonald	Serrano
Hoyer	Miller, George	Skelton
Hyde	Minge	Slaughter
Jackson (IL)	Mink	Snyder
Jackson-Lee	Mollohan	Stark
(TX)	Moore	Stenholm
Jefferson	Moran (VA)	Strickland
Jenkins	Morella	Stump
Johnson, E. B.	Nadler	Stupak
Jones (OH)	Napolitano	Tanner
Kanjorski	Neal	Terry
Kennedy	Oberstar	Thompson (CA)
Kilpatrick	Obey	Thompson (MS)
King (NY)	Ortiz	Thornberry
Klecza	Ose	Tierney
Klink	Pastor	Toomey
Knollenberg	Paul	Towns
Kolbe	Payne	Turner
Lampson	Pelosi	Udall (CO)
Larson	Pickett	Udall (NM)
Leach	Pombo	Velazquez
Lee	Pomeroy	Vento
Lewis (GA)	Porter	Visclosky
Maloney (NY)	Rangel	Walsh
Markey	Reyes	Waters
Martinez	Rodriguez	Watt (NC)
Matsui	Rothman	Waxman
McCarthy (MO)	Roybal-Allard	Weiner
McDermott	Rush	Wexler
McGovern	Sabo	Weygand
McKinney	Sanchez	Whitfield
Meehan	Sanders	Woolsey
Meek (FL)	Sanford	Wu
Meeks (NY)	Sawyer	Young (AK)

## NOT VOTING—11

Bliley	Hilleary	Manzullo
Bono	Holt	Olver
Brown (CA)	Kasich	Wynn
Conyers	Lofgren	

□ 1153

Messrs. CRAMER, OXLEY, and DEUTSCH changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. EMERSON). It is now in order to debate the subject of the policy of the United States relating to the conflict in Kosovo.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE).

Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chairman, as the 3-month air war appears to be winding down and NATO operations in Yugoslavia appear headed for a new and, in my opinion, perhaps more troubling phase for our country, I think it is entirely appropriate that the House have a debate over various aspects of our Kosovo policy.

Over the past few months, the issue of this administration's policy has been contentious and confusing not only to the Congress but to the American people, as well. Under such circumstances, I do not understand why debate is a bad thing.

In my personal opinion, the conflict in Kosovo and the wider wars in the Balkans do not directly impact on core United States national security interests. Our interests in the current conflict are primarily humanitarian.

Madam Chairman, in the words of NATO Secretary General Solana, Oper-

ation Allied Force is "a war fought for values." I am not minimizing the importance of values. They mean a lot to the American people and to me personally.

Americans take their political values seriously. We declared our independence from Great Britain on the basis of inalienable rights. Yet, as a Nation, when it comes to matters of national security and foreign policy, when it comes to matters of these kind, we have always tempered our values with an appreciation of our broader national interests, as did the Founding Fathers, who were especially weary of foreign entanglements.

The need for a clear right assessment of the national interest is especially important when it comes to the use of United States military force. Committing our Armed Forces to combat should never be done without an objective reckoning of interest, cost, and benefits. Indeed, that ought to be our solemn obligation to the men and women in uniform who place their lives at risk to protect and promote American interests all around what remains a dangerous world.

We cannot afford to simply ask whether the cause is just but whether we are willing and able to pay the many direct and indirect costs necessary to achieve victory if victory can be clearly defined.

The costs to our Armed Forces of ongoing operations in the Balkans from 1995 until today has been substantial and continues to rise exponentially. Also, there is no end in sight.

Including the funds recently approved by Congress in the Kosovo supplemental and in this bill, the cost of operations in the Balkans is approaching \$20 billion.

□ 1200

That figure represents just the incremental costs to the Department of Defense, the costs of the additional fuel, munitions, spare parts, personnel and other associated costs with operations in the Balkans. It does not begin to cover the capital costs associated with raising, equipping, training and maintaining our armed forces.

Put simply, American military commitments in the Balkans have risen to the level of a third major war, over and above the two potential major wars facing us in Korea and Southwest Asia, and form the basis of our United States national strategy. We are involved in an unanticipated major war in Europe with a military force that in my view is overextended and underresourced to the point where it cannot effectively protect our national interests around the world, nor can it execute the Nation's military strategy in time of war.

These basic realities have shaped my position in regard to our operations in the Balkans over the past several years. I do not downplay the humanitarian tragedy that has befallen the Balkans. None of us do. With our military already overextended, I have long

maintained that it is unwise to commit our forces, especially United States ground forces, to an open-ended commitment in Southern Europe that would place our other vital interests around the world at immediate and, in my opinion, unacceptable risk. Parenthetically I note that the two new incoming Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Marine Corps have expressed similar concerns about this matter.

Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that our armed forces are at a fraction of their Gulf War strength of the late 1990s, it seems that the administration has approached this entire Balkans policy for the past several years and certainly the past several months in isolation from Korea or the Persian Gulf. We must first and foremost consider our security and foreign policy with our heads, not just our hearts. And we cannot consider the signals we send to Serbia separately from the signals we send to Iraq and Iran and North Korea or any other nation that is or might become our adversary where the threats posed are a higher degree than that in the Balkans.

I urge my colleagues to bear in mind our global interests and responsibilities and the ability of our military forces to protect all of these interests as we debate the Kosovo policy today and in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Let us speak of Kosovo today. We have achieved, our country has achieved, NATO has achieved a victory in the field of battle in the Balkans. The issues we debate today and the votes taken today will tell whether we keep that victory or whether we sour it or whether we throw ashes on it and tell those young men and young women who have been in harm's way that their efforts were for good or whether they were for naught.

Mr. Chairman, never in the history of this country has a Congress voted to deprive America of a military victory in the field after it has been achieved. It is my sincere hope that this Congress today will not deprive America, will not deprive the NATO nations of a victory that it has achieved by placing young men and young women in harm's way.

The House is now going to consider a series of amendments concerning our involvement in NATO operations in Yugoslavia. The House should approve my amendment to delete section 1006(a) of the bill and we should approve the Taylor amendment which outlines the goals for our military and peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia. However, we should reject the Souder amendment, which is even more restrictive than the flawed language that is in the bill, and we should reject the Fowler amendment because the House debated and rejected a similar Fowler amendment in March by a vote of 178-237.